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In attempting to understand cooperation, economists have used the methods of
experimental economics to focus on spheres of human behavior in which humans
display altruism, reciprocity, or other social preferences through giving and through
punishment. Recent work has begun to examine whether allowing allocations in the
negative domain, that is, allowing subjects to take (or steal) other subjects'
endowments, might aect participants' behavior. If participants' behavior is aected,
then our understanding of experimental results generally, and social preferences
specically, should be aected too (List 2007, Bardsley 2008). In this paper we
propose an experimental variation on the Dictator Game with third-party
punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b). We examine, rst, a basic Dictator Game
with third-party punishment, after which we introduce a treatment allowing the
dictator to take from the receiver, in the knowledge that the third party could punish
them. The results conict. Many dictators choose the most self-interested option,
while, when taking is introduced as an option for the dictator, third parties punish
the most self-interested option more than in the baseline.
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1 Introduction
Prospero, the protagonist in Shakespeare's Tempest, instructs us that \the
rarer action is in virtue than in vengeance." For some time experimental
economists have investigated people's behavior as they decide how to allo-
cate endowments either to other subjects in experiments, or to some public
good from which they might benet, thus examining the virtues of giving,
cooperation and cooperation-sustaining punishment (Camerer 2003, Henrich
et al. 2006). But Prospero warns that vengeance is more common than virtue,
though economists have only recently begun to take heed by examining vicious
behavior (Kirchsteiger 1994, Saijo & Nakamura 1995, Abbink, Irlenbusch &
Renner 2000, Abbink & Sadrieh 2009, Abbink & Herrmann 2009). This paper
contributes to the literature by examining an experiment that allows taking, in
the presence of potential punishment.
Why should we care about giving and taking, and not giving only? First,
in everyday interactions an individual's actions are not truncated: she has the
option to give and to take, to behave altruistically or nastily, to punish proso-
cially or antisocially (Fehr & G achter 2002, Fehr & Fischbacher 2004a, Frey &
Meier 2004, Cinyabuguma, Page & Putterman 2006, Bochet, Page & Putterman
2006, Herrmann, Th oni & G achter 2008, Casari & Luini 2009). Second, if we
consider range eects, then an individual might be predisposed to give some-
thing not because she actually wishes to behave altruistically, but because it is
not the lowest amount possible - therefore signalled as the most self-interested
- to give (Parducci & Weddell 1986). Constraining an individual's actions so
that she must behave only in the positive, and therefore altruistic, domain is
a contrivance, and we should allow individuals to employ actions that are not
only altruistic (giving), or not altruistic (neither giving nor taking), but also
entirely self-interested (taking). We may thus explore what Prospero thought
the more common actions: vengeance, spitefulness, robbery, abuse.
But most researchers who have worked on the topic have used the dictator
game to elicit preferences over giving and taking (Bardsley 2008, List 2007).1
The problem with this method is that the dictator game is not so much a
`game' as it is a decision by one agent - the dictator. Games require beliefs
and actions by more than one player. Consequently, it would be valuable to
assess the changes in decisions by subjects in experiments where subjects need
to predicate their decision on the beliefs they have about others. The third-party
punishment game allows us to capture such eects by predicating the dictator's
activities on the knowledge that a third party, with the power to reduce the
dictator's payos and thus to `punish' them, is involved in the game. Moreover,
it allows us to investigate the role of costly punishment in maintaining social
norms amid the option to take.
Experiments that provide an adequate environment to interrogate taking
can expand our understanding of whether the incidence and extent of social
preferences - altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion - are as great as the accu-
mulated international and cross-cultural evidence suggests (Camerer 2003, Hen-
1Bosman & van Winden (2002), Bosman, Sutter & van Winden (2005) and Bosman,
Hennig-Schmidt & van Winden (2006) use a `power to take' game. But, this game tends
to restrict dictator behavior to the negative domain only and is consequently subject to the
same criticism as experiments that only allow behavior in the positive domain: it falsely
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rich et al. 2006, Herrmann, Th oni & G achter 2008). Without research into the
dynamics of taking, previous results might lead us to believe falsely that social
preferences are more both more widespread and more salient than they are. Al-
ternatively, if we do investigate taking behavior rigorously, then we may become
aware of the operation of social preferences in previously unexplored domains
of human behavior. We may see whether subjects take, whether subjects re-
spond to the presence of taking, and, in the context of the games we investigate,
whether the option to take changes punishment behavior that may sustain or
undermine social norms.
We present evidence from a third party punishment game with a taking
treatment: the dictator can take up to the entire show-up fee of the receiver.
Dictator behavior was mixed, with dictators both giving and taking. Taking
behavior was punished by more third parties and more harshly in the taking
treatment than the most self-interested behavior in the baseline treatment, sug-
gesting a role for a third party as an enforcer of social norms. The remainder
of the paper progresses as follows. In section 2, we explain the experimental
design and the results from the experiment. In section 3 we discuss the results
and assess them against current theories of social preferences. Some concluding
comments are oered in section 4.
2 Experimental Design and Results
The experimental design synthesizes two separate designs: the design of dictator
taking from Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) with the design of a third party
punishment in the dictator game from Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b). The taking
treatment is most similar to List's and Bardsley's treatments in which dictators
are allowed to take from receivers. The taking treatment is most consistent with
List's because dictators may take up to the entire show-up fee of the receiver,
whereas Bardsley does not allow dictators to adopt such actions.2
2.1 Design
Subjects were recruited from the student body at the University of Cape Town
during the second and third quarters of the 2010 academic year. A baseline and
one treatment were conducted. Identical procedures and parallel instructions
were used, based on the English language translation of instructions in Fehr
& Fischbacher (2004b). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
groups, and each group was allocated to a separate room: Room A, B or C.
All participants met at a central location at the beginning of the experiment
to assuage any doubt about the existence of co-participants (Frohlich, Oppen-
heimer & Moore 2001). That is, the subjects saw that there were other subjects
and that subjects were individually and randomly allocated to one of room A,
B or C, but at no time could subjects communicate with one another. Sub-
jects were only permitted to communicate with the experimenters. No subject
participated in more than one treatment, so the results reect between-subject
variation only.
2During recruitment, prospective subjects were told that they could make no money during
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The baseline treatment was modeled on the third-party punishment in the
dictator game (TP-DG) experiment (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b, 66). Subjects
played with points, not money. The exchange rate of points for money was 1
point equal to 1 South African Rand (ZAR) as a monetary unit (MU).3 All
subjects were allocated a show-up fee of 20MUs, or 20 points. A dictator in
room A was given 80 points and she could allocate up to 40 points to her
counterpart receiver - her randomly allocated partner in room B - in multiples of
ve. The 40-point maximum was selected, consistent with Fehr and Fischbacher,
to highlight the `distributional norm' of 50%. The third party in Room C was
randomly partnered with subjects in Rooms A and B. The third party was given
40 points that she could use to reduce the dictator's payos at a rate of 1 to 3:
each point she spent would reduce the dictator's payo by 3 points. The third
party could spend any number of points to reduce the dictator's payo. We
used the strategy method, asking the third party how many deduction points
she would charge for each potential dictator transfer. The receiver was given no
additional points. After each treatment, subjects were asked to ll out answers
to a questionnaire consistent with G achter, Herrmann & Th oni (2004) and Fehr
& Fischbacher (2004b).
The treatment Take 20 is identical in every way to the baseline treatment,
except that the set of actions for the dictator extends not only over [0, 40]
points, but is extended to allow the dictator to take up to the entire show-up
fee given to receivers. Dictators could take in multiples of ve: 5, 10, 15 or 20
points. This implies that a dictator's action set is now [-20, 40] points. Though
this diers from List's (2007) `neutral' mid-point of zero, the intention was to
provide a signicant endowment to the dictator rather than to have symmetrical
smaller endowments.
With a model of self-interested money-maximising, the subgame perfect equi-
librium for the third-party punishment game is for the dictator to give nothing,
and for the third party not to punish. In the taking treatment, the subgame
perfect equilibrium would require that the dictator take the entire amount that
she could - 20 points - and require that the third party not punish any alloca-
tion. The various models of social preferences and social norms would instead
stipulate that subjects, to some greater or lesser extent, have regard for others'
payos or adhere to norms of fairness or equity. That is, rather than prefer-
ences that are only self-regarding and consider an agent's own material gain,
the agent also considers the material gain of others. Such behavior is often
called other-regarding behavior. Were subjects to behave other-regardingly,
then they might give in the baseline, not take as much as they could (that is,
not behave entirely selshly) in the taking treatment, or punish others either
for not giving in the baseline or for taking in the taking treatment (Fehr &
Schmidt 1999, Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b, Levitt & List 2007, Bowles 2008, Car-
penter & Matthews 2009).
2.2 Results
Table 1 and Table 2 and Figure 1 to Figure 4 summarize the individual data
obtained from the third-party punishment games. The sample comprises 195
3At the time of the experiments, ZAR 1=USD 0.13. As an index, the show-up fee is ap-
proximately twice the urban wage for services and hospitality. Thus the dictator's endowment
of 80 points is worth just less than one eight-hour day's work at this minimum wage.Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games 5
individuals in total, with 34 dictators and 35 third parties in the baseline treat-
ment and 31 dictators and 30 third parties in the Take 20 treatment forming
an unbalanced experimental sample. We assess dictator giving and taking, then
we proceed to examine third-party punishment.
We report descriptive statistics to show that the subjects' choices are aected
by the option to take. Making the assumption of normality of the distributions
of allocations that are required for most tests seems unfeasible given the distri-
butions of the data (Friedman & Cassar 2005). Consequently, non-parametric
tests are used to examine whether behavior diers in the treatments.4 With
respect to punishment, researchers have typically undertaken regression anal-
ysis of the Minimum Unned Oer (MUO) because it may be more amenable
to regression analysis and statistical inference (Marlowe et al. 2008, Henrich
et al. 2010). We report the MUOs, but also discuss how using the MUO as a
variable of observation is problematic for the sample.
Four main results demand attention: rst, the largest proportion of dicta-
tors adopts the most self-interested behavior in both the baseline and in the
treatment; second, dictators make signicantly fewer positive allocations when
taking is permitted; third, un-self-interested dictator behavior remains preva-
lent in both the baseline and the treatment; and, fourth, though punishment by
third parties does not signicantly dier in most cases, the most self-interested
option is punished substantially more severely in the taking treatment than in
the baseline.
2.2.1 Dictator Behavior
In the baseline treatment, approximately 65% of dictators made positive oers.
In the Take 20 treatment, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of
positive oers as only 29% of the dictators made positive oers. Where pB is
the proportion of dictators who give in the baseline and pT is the proportion of
dictators who give in the Take 20 treatment, it is necessary to evaluate whether
dG  pB   pT is signicantly dierent from zero. The bootstrap condence
interval for dG is  0:5776  dG   0:1254.5 The dierence in the proportion
of dictators who choose to give is signicant at the 1% level.
The average dictator in the Baseline made a low allocation relative to the
literature on either dictator games or third-party punishment games.6 Dictators'
allocations in the baseline treatment were 10.85% of their endowment, and the
4Bernhard, Fischbacher & Fehr (2006) undertake ordered probit regressions to evaluate
punishment, but their treatments involved the same experimental structure with variations in
ethnic composition as the treatment and not changes in the range of allocations, therefore we
cannot perform the same analysis.
5Following Bardsley (2008, 127, FN4), for whom the methodological constraints were simi-
lar, when proportions approach zero, the Z-test for equality of proportion and the chi-squared
tests are insucient. We use the bootstrap method, consistent with Efron (1979) and Efron
& Tibshirani (1986). For the baseline, a number of draws equal to the sample size was taken,
with replacement, and repeated 10 000 times. This was repeated for the Take 20 treatment.
The two-sided condence intervals were calculated with the percentile method, from which
we obtained the p-values (Cameron & Trivedi 2005, Good 2006, Cameron & Trivedi 2009).
6In Camerer (2003), the average dictator allocates approximately 20% of the dictator's
endowment. South African dictator allocations have ranged from 15%-26% of their endow-
ments (Burns 2004, Van der Merwe & Burns 2008, Ashraf, Bohnet & Piankov 2006). In Fehr
& Fischbacher's (2004b, 69) third party punishment games, dictators allocated an average of
24.5% of their total endowment.Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games 6
average positive allocation was 16.76% of the dictator's endowment. In the Take
20 treatment, the average oer was negative, and, though the incidence of giving
is lower, the average allocation is higher as the average positive oer increases
to 25.69% of the dictator's endowment.
Contrasting the median and modal oers, we see, rst, that the median
allocation for the baseline is 10 (12.5% of the total), whereas in the Take 20
treatment the median allocation is -10 (50% of the total amount possible to
take). We see, second, that the modal allocations are 0 in the baseline and -20
in the Take 20 treatment. These foreshadow the result that a large proportion
of dictators behaved as self-interestedly as they could.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide further insight for the distribution of alloca-
tions. In Figure 1, the mode appears at zero, though several dictators make
positive allocations up to a maximum of 35 points. In Figure 2, we observe
a mode at the allocation -20 (32% of dictators made this allocation), with an
additional 23% allocating -10, and 6.5% of subjects allocating 0. Unlike in List
(2007), when introducing the ability to take, this sample does not display two
modes at the most self-interested allocation (-20) and neither taking nor giving
(an allocation of zero). This result may be a consequence of the construction of
the treatment: its mid-point remains a positive amount, rather than at zero as
was the case with in List's construction.
Were it the case that a range eect obtained, we would expect that the
maximum positive oer should decrease in lock-step with the decrease in the
minimum bound. This is not the case. In fact, the maximum observed allocation
is higher in the treatment (40 MUs) than in the baseline (35 MUs). We could
ignore this as an outlier, but allocations of 20, 25 and 30 remain. These would
be inconsistent with the allocations being a range eect only.
2.2.2 Third Party Behavior
The aggregate third party behavior is depicted in Table 2, with some incidence
of punishment shown in Figure 3 and average punishment shown in Figure 4.
First, the most relevant dierence in punishment behavior is that there are
fewer third parties who never punish in the Take 20 treatment than there are
in the baseline. Second, there are more third parties who punish all allocations
in the taking treatment (16%) than there are in the baseline treatment (4%).
Third, as shown in Figure 3, though punishment in the baseline third-party
punishment game follows the customary trend of decreasing as the allocation
increased, this is not the case in the taking treatments where some punishment
of high allocations also occurs. Fourth, as shown in Figure 4, though the average
number of deduction points allocated to punishment is lower in this sample than
in others internationally, the pattern of high spending at low allocations and
lower spending at high allocations is maintained, which reects the evidence.7
Finally, the punishment of the most self-interested behavior is more severe in
the taking treatment than in the baseline.
In the Take 20 treatment, the level of punishment is highest (8.73 deduction
points) at an allocation of -20 points, and decreases to 4.3 deduction points at
a zero allocation. The punishment diers distinctly from the outcome for the
baseline treatment, where punishment decreases at higher positive allocations.
7See Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) and Bernhard, Fischbacher & Fehr (2006).Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games 7
The amount of punishment is low given the literature.8 The level of punishment
is 14.28% for zero allocations in the baseline, and 10.75% for zero allocations
and 21.83% for -20 allocations in the Take 20 treatment. Thus the only level
of punishment that is remotely similar to Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) is that of
the highest punishment in the sample: punishment of those who take 20 points.
Similar to the analysis of giving by the dictators, we assess whether there
is a signicant dierence between the proportion of punishers in the baseline
and in the taking treatment. Bootstrap tests were run for the proportion that
punishes overall, and the proportion of individuals that chooses to punish at
each dictator allocation. For each of these, therefore, there is a proportion, pB,
of third parties that chooses to punish in the baseline and there is a proportion,
pT, that chooses to punish in the Take 20 treatment. Evaluating whether the
dierence di  pB   pT is signicantly dierent from zero requires inferring a
bootstrap condence interval. The values for each of these bootstrap tests is
presented in Table 3. The only signicant dierence in proportions occurs at a
dictator allocation of 40, so subjects in the Take 20 treatment were more likely
to punish a dictator allocation of 40 than subjects in the baseline.
With punishment we can also examine what is known as the `minimum
unned oer' (MUO) (Marlowe et al. 2008, Barr et al. 2009, Henrich et al. 2010).
The MUO is the lowest oer for which an individual no longer punishes (Henrich
et al. 2010, 1483). In the baseline treatment, if a subject punishes oers of 0
and 5 points, but not 10 points or higher, then that subject's MUO is 10 points.
A subject's MUO is a measure of that subject's willingness to punish low oers.
The MUOs are presented in Figure 5.
In the current sample, however, there are several problems with using the
MUO. Customarily, one uses the MUO if there is a sucient proportion of the
sample that has an MUO above which there is no ning. For example, it may
be expected that a subject will punish low oers, then at some MUO choose to
stop punishing. Contrastingly, a subject could punish low oers, stop punishing,
then punish high oers. Alternatively, a subject could punish no low oers (thus
having the lowest possible MUO), but punish high oers: that is, she punishes
`generosity'. Finally, a subject could punish all oers, in which case she does
not have an MUO. In the current sample of third parties, 6% punish all dictator
allocations and do not have MUOs. A further 37% of third parties have MUOs
above which they choose to punish. Consequently, to analyze MUOs in the
customary manner would require dropping approximately 43% of the sample of
third parties and assuming that the data is randomly rather than systematically
missing. Consequently we do not believe it is justied to analyze MUOs.
3 Discussion
When it comes to dictator behavior, two results are consistent with List (2007)
and Bardsley (2008). First, many of the dictators in the sample make the purely
self-interested choice: they give nothing in the baseline, or take 20 points in the
Take 20 treatment. Giving is not the behavior of the majority of subjects. Sec-
ond, and obversely, some fraction of each subject pool also made allocations that
were not purely self-interested. If a subject took, she may not have taken every-
8In Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b, 68) third parties used approximately 28% of their endow-
ment to punish an allocation of zero.Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games 8
thing; or she may have allocated zero in the taking treatment; or she may have
given some of her endowment away. This mixed evidence is therefore consis-
tent with a model in which some agents are purely self-interested and others are
not. Social preferences may, therefore, explain some subjects' behavior, whereas
preferences based on self-interest may explain the behavior of others. Alterna-
tively, a model based on incorporating social norms, culture and identity may
also explain the results, though the social norms to which individuals adhere
would be heterogeneous (Akerlof & Kranton 2000, Akerlof & Kranton 2005).
With taking we can begin to examine the extent of what List calls the `moral'
cost function derived from Levitt & List (2007, 156). Levitt and List argue that
actions result in utility through two channels: the wealth gained and the moral
costs incurred as a consequence of an action. The moral costs incurred are a
function of the amounts involved in the game, the set of social norms against
a behavior, and the degree of scrutiny. Similar to List (2007, 488-489), there
appears to be a dierent type of moral cost to taking than to giving nothing
because of the prevalence of taking.
When interpreting the dierences in average positive oers, it seems as
though the introduction of taking as an option makes `unfair' positive or neg-
ative oers more salient for some subjects. Dictators who had their choices
framed by the potential to take may have given more than their counterparts in
the baseline experiment who did not have their choices framed by the potential
to take. This is not consistent with theories of social preferences in which the
simple addition of four actions allowing taking alters the behavior of subjects
concerned with fairness, reciprocity or conditional cooperation.
Considering punishment, the results are somewhat more dicult to interpret
and it is dicult to say whether they are consistent with other evidence. First,
the behavior of third parties in the baseline is consistent with other evidence
from third-party punishment games: punishment has a relatively high incidence
at low allocations, but decreases steadily at higher allocations. One anomaly,
though, is that the incidence of punishment is lower at an allocation of 0 than
it is at an allocation of 5, which suggests a strategic motive to avoid punishing
at this allocation. Alternatively, third parties may want individuals to behave
`honestly' in the sense that if a dictator is self-interested, then a third party
may prefer for them to allocate zero than to allocate a negligible 5 points.
Finally, third parties may have wanted to appear as though they were willing
to punish certain some self-interested allocations, but that they expected the
zero allocation to be more common and wanted not to have to punish at that
allocation.
In the taking treatment, the behavior of third parties is inconsistent with
previous evidence: though third parties in the Take 20 treatment punish nega-
tive allocations severely, third parties also seem to have a much higher average
punishment level than in the baseline. It is unclear whether the results show-
ing the dierences in punishment levels in Figure 4 indicate true antisocial
punishment, that is, an objection to the behavior of those who `cooperate' by
punishing them, or an objection to inequality (Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Falk &
Fischbacher 2006, Fehr & Schmidt 2010), or spite towards those who had the
option to take (Levine 1998), or some state-based preference (Frohlich, Oppen-
heimer & Moore 2001, Bowles 2008).
Though the evidence may be ambiguous for the theories discussed above,
we can conclude that the results are inconsistent with other theories. Bolton &Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games 9
Ockenfels's (2000) theory predicts no punishment, most especially because the
third party already has a `fair share' of one third. Moreover, pure reciprocity
theories, for example Rabin (1993), would predict reciprocal punishment by B
of A if B could punish, but such a theory does not include the possibility for
C to punish A when C was not aected directly by A's actions. The evidence
from these experiments does not support either of these theories.
To investigate inequity aversion, Barr et al. (2009) provide a useful one-
parameter model as an elucidation of Fehr & Schmidt (1999). Based on the
model, Barr et al. (2009) predict subgame perfect responses for punishment and
allocations in the TP-DG. They say, `oers weakly greater than 1
2 should never
be ned in the third-party punishment game' (Barr et al. 2009, 15). Their
full sample had an incidence of 6% for punishment for amounts greater than
50%. The problem, though, is that they do not detail levels of punishment
in the range of 25-50%, or what could be thought of as 50% or greater of the
distribution norm (40 points). Considering that their logic for oers greater
than 50% could be applied to oers of exactly 50%, we see that their one-
parameter version of the utility function may not hold when the option to take
is introduced. Taking should not aect the predictions in their model because
allowing subjects to take simply includes possibilities in the negative domain.
Barr et al.'s (2009) model implies, with the positive endowments given, that
some subjects should make positive allocations and others will punish, but these
distributions should not be sensitive to an expansion of the dictator's action set
to the negative domain of allocations. Nevertheless, when the action set was
expanded to include taking, many more subjects (40%) punished an allocation
of 50% than in the baseline (11.43%). The bootstrap condence intervals show
that this is the one allocation where the baseline and taking treatment did
not coincide. These results contravene the predictions that Barr et al. made
because the subjects' behavior has been aected by the option to take. The
evidence therefore conicts with some constructions of inequity aversion, but
may be consistent with the general idea of inequity if it includes possibilities for
subjects to punish those whose action sets include options to take.
4 Conclusion
The results from the experiments indicate several similarities to preceding re-
search investigating third party punishment and dictator games. Consistent
with the literature, dictator behavior was mixed: many dictators made positive
oers, and many dictators also behaved entirely self-interestedly by either giving
nothing in the baseline or taking the most that they could in the taking treat-
ment. The results therefore provide tentative support for the existence of indi-
viduals who adhere to dierent behavioral rules where a signicant proportion of
subjects behave entirely self-interestedly while others behave other-regardingly
(Camerer 2003, List 2007, Bardsley 2008). Punishment in the baseline fol-
lowed accepted patterns (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b, Bernhard, Fischbacher &
Fehr 2006, Marlowe et al. 2008). Punishment in the taking treatment, how-
ever, showed a slightly dierent pattern: there was a signicant incidence of
punishment across all allocations, higher incidence of punishment and greater
average punishment of the most self-interested allocations, and higher incidence
of punishment and higher average punishment of the least self-interested oers.Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games 10
The results therefore show that a theory based only on material self-interest
does not adequately describe the behavior of the individuals in the sample, but
neither does a model of behavior based only on inequality aversion. A mixed
model may oer a more plausible representation of the behavior of subjects in
this sample. The results oer additional evidence that experimental economists
may have constructed experiments in such a way that the virtuous actions have
appeared more common than the vicious.
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Table 1: Aggregate Dictator Behavior
Proportion of Mean Median Modal Average
Treatment (n) Positive Oers Oer Oer Oer Positive Oer
Baseline (34) .65 8.68 10 0 13.41
Take 20 (31) .29 -4.19 -10 -20 20.55
Oers are in points, not percentages.
The average positive oer ignores zero and negative oers.
Table 2: Aggregate Third Party Behavior
Baseline Take Overall
20
Never Punish .29 .17 .23
Punish Only Allocations .20 .04 .18
Beneath 50% of Potential
y
Punish Only Allocations .04 .04 .04
Above 50% of Potential
y
Punish at .56 .56 .56
Zero Allocation
y
Punishers who punish - .96 -
allocations below zero
y
Punishers who .04 .16 .10
always punish
y
Overall n 35 30 65
y As a proportion of those who punished.
Table 3: Third Party Bootstrap Tests
Overall  :0843  dO  0:3174
Allocate 40 0:0745  dA40  0:4910
y
Allocate 35  0:0770  dA35  0:3975
Allocate 30  0:08  dA30  0:4106
Allocate 25  0:2295  dA25  0:2623
Allocate 20  0:3159  dA20  0:1721
Allocate 15  0:3462  dA15  0:1381
Allocate 10  0:2585  dA10  0:2365
Allocate 5  0:2558  dA5  0:2306
Allocate 0  0:1411  dA0  0:345351
y Signicant at the 99% level of condence.Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games 14
Fig 1: Baseline Treatment
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Fig 3: Proportion of Punishers
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